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         Kant Immanuel:     more books (100)
  1. Kant's Critique of aesthetic judgement; by Immanuel, 1724-1804 Kant, 2009-10-26
  2. Kant 's prolegomena to any future metaphysics edited in English by Kant. Immanuel. 1724-1804., 1912-01-01
  3. Immanuel Kant 1724-1804
  4. Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) (The British Academy.Annual philosophical lecture.Henriette Hertz trust) by James Ward, 1923
  5. Critique of pure reason in commemoration of the centenary of its by Kant. Immanuel. 1724-1804., 1896-01-01
  6. The philosophy of law; an exposition of the fundamental principl by Kant. Immanuel. 1724-1804., 1887-01-01
  7. Metaphysiche Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft. with: Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten. . with: Prolegomena zu einer jeden künstigen Metaphysik die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten können. by Immanuel (1724-1804). KANT, 1783
  8. Critique of pure reason in commemoration of the century of its f by Kant. Immanuel. 1724-1804., 1881-01-01
  9. Correspondence (The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant in Translation) by Immanuel Kant, 2007-07-02
  10. Kant: A Biography by Manfred Kuehn, 2002-08-19
  11. Immanuel Kant's Moral Theory by Roger J. Sullivan, 1989-02-24
  12. Immanuel Kant (S U N Y Series in Ethical Theory) by Otfried Hoffe, 1994-09
  13. Kant: A Biography by Manfred Kuehn, 2002-08-19
  14. Kant's Foundations of Ethics by ImmanuelKant, 1995-12

41. Could Kant Have Been A Utilitarian?
Provocative extract from the book Sorting Out Ethics by R. M. Hare.
http://deontology.com/
COULD KANT HAVE BEEN A UTILITARIAN?
RM Hare
[An extract from Sorting out ethics ... the supreme end, the happiness of all mankind KrV The law concerning punishment is a Categorical Imperative; and woe to him who rummages around in the winding paths of a theory of happiness, looking for some advantage to be gained by releasing the criminal from punishment or by reducing the amount of it ... Rl . MY aim in this chapter is to ask a question, not to answer it. To answer it with confidence would require more concentrated study of Kant's text than I have yet had time for. I have read his main ethical works, and formed some tentative conclusions which I shall diffidently state. I have also read some of his English-speaking disciples and would-be disciples, but not, I must admit, any of his German expositors except Leonard Nelson. But my purpose in raising the question is to enlist the help of others in answering it. To many the answer will seem obvious: for it is an accepted dogma that Kant and the utilitarians stand at opposite poles of moral philosophy. This idea has been the current orthodoxy at least since, in the early twentieth century, Prichard and Ross, deontologists themselves, thought they had found a father in Kant. John Rawls, in turn, has been deeply influenced by these intuitionist philosophers, and does not think it necessary to document very fully the Kantian parentage of their views. As a result, the story that Kant and utilitarians have to be at odds is now regularly told to all beginner students of moral philosophy.

42. Kant, Immanuel | Kant, Immanuel Information | HighBeam Research - FREE Trial
Kant, Immanuel Research Kant, Immanuel articles at HighBeam.com. Find information, facts and related newspaper, magazine and journal articles in our online encyclopedia.
http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G2-3404200299.html

43. Kant, Immanuel: Metaphysics [Internet Encyclopedia Of Philosophy]
Historical background and explanation of his metaphysical ideas.
http://www.iep.utm.edu/k/kantmeta.htm
Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Immanuel Kant: Metaphysics
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) is one of the most influential philosophers in the history of Western philosophy. His contributions to metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and aesthetics have had a profound impact on almost every philosophical movement that followed him. This article focuses on his metaphysics and epistemology in one of his most important works, The Critique of Pure Reason .  A large part of Kant’s work addresses the question “What can we know?” The answer, if it can be stated simply, is that our knowledge is constrained to mathematics and the science of the natural, empirical world. It is impossible, Kant argues, to extend knowledge to the supersensible realm of speculative metaphysics. The reason that knowledge has these constraints, Kant argues, is that the mind plays an active role in constituting the features of experience and limiting the mind’s access only to the empirical realm of space and time. Kant responded to his predecessors by arguing against the Empiricists that the mind is not a blank slate that is written upon by the empirical world, and by rejecting the Rationalists’ notion that pure, a priori knowledge of a mind-independent world was possible.  Reason itself is structured with forms of experience and categories that give a phenomenal and logical structure to any possible object of empirical experience.  These categories cannot be circumvented to get at a mind-independent world, but they are necessary for experience of spatio-temporal objects with their causal behavior and logical properties.  These two theses constitute Kant’s famous transcendental idealism and empirical realism.

44. Kant On Autonomy
An article on Kant s philosophy on this topic.
http://www-personal.umich.edu/~sdarwall/433k198.txt
Philosophy 433 History of Ethics Darwall Winter 1998 KANT I I As weve seen, Rousseau maintains that "moral liberty" or autonomy is only possibility within a consensual civic association. This is because he believes that such self- determination consists in a citizen's guiding herself by laws she prescribes for herself, and that the only standpoint available for such legislation is the common standpoint of an actual community through the general will. Now this imposes some fairly heavy requirements. (a) For example, it is a condition of the possibility of such a general will's existing that there be a common good, i.e. some determinate truth about what would be rightly seen to be valuable from the common standpoint. (b) It is a further requirement, moreover, that this common good be authoritative. There can be no further standpoint from which one can sensibly question whether one should do what the general will requires. What the general will requires is itself constitutive of what one ought to do, since what one ought to do is constituted by laws (any)one of us would prescribe from that standpoint. There is no further critical standpoint one can take up. The conjunction of these requirements may well be questioned. Can the common interests of any particular community with which she is identified be authoritative for an autonomous agent in the sense that no further standpoint can exist from which she can sensibly raise the question whether she should do as seems best from its point of view? Indeed, in the conditions of contemporary life, when one may belong to various overlapping communities of shared value. And where many communities with conflicting shared values contend, we may well be skeptical that any satisfactory form of common life for all, in some widest community composed of such communities, can be based on any very robust conception of shared value without the use of force. [Here we get the liberal idea that we need a way of thinking about principles for a form of association that do not presuppose agreement in conceptions of the good life.] II At this point it is natural to turn to Kant. Kant takes from Rousseau both the account of moral obligation as constituted by laws that are self-prescribed and, hence, that the moral life realizes self-determination. [And also Rousseau's idea that human beings have a distinctive dignity that is inconsistent with simply being mastered and used by another.] But, instead of holding that such autonomy is realized in being guided by the general will of a particular community (in which one participates as a member), Kant argues that genuinely moral obligations or imperatives derive from a fundamental principle that is valid for all rational moral agents (and not just this or that particular community), and that they consist in laws or principles that would be prescribed for all from a point of view that is, in principle, available to any rational moral agent as such. Morality strikes us, he thinks, as universal and categorical. When we conceive of ourselves as under a moral obligation, say, not to lie in some circumstance, we don't conceive of this obligation as arising from anything that could be peculiar to our community all the way down. If we press on our belief, we shall see that we think ourselves to be constrained most fundamentally by something we think applies also to any being capable of guiding her life by a conception of law. [n.b. This does not require that we think that a moral obligation of a given, specific content requires a universal obligation to which all moral agents are subject with that very same content. All Kant has to think is that there is some fundamental principle, to which all moral agents are subject, in which any specific moral obligation applying to a specific agent must be grounded.] Moreover, again, if we press, we will come to see that our conception of moral obligation is of something which binds us categorically. III Kant is famous for the thesis that moral obligations are categorical imperatives. This actually includes two ideas, two different aspects of an emerging modern conception of moral obligation. (a) First, it includes the idea that moral obligations are morally inescapable; whether one does what one is morally obligated to do is, morally speaking, nonoptional. It is wrong to fail to do what one is morally obligated to do, whether one wants to do it or not. (b) Second, it includes the idea that moral obligations are justificationally inescapable. If one is morally obligated to do something, then one has an overriding justification for doing it. There can be no adequate justification for doing what is morally wrong. IV We can see these two distinguishable elements, and the desire to bring them together, throughout the period we have been studying. (a) Thus, in Hobbes, we saw two different conceptions of normative constraint, which he tries to connect together: his official notion of obligation (created by transferring a right) and one that is involved in the laws of nature. This latter notion is a conception of fundamental justification, and one of the great dialectical burdens of Leviathan is trying to show that any "obligation"'s created by a contract or covenant (moral, or normative constraint in the first sense) are such that an agent could not possibly be justified in failing to abide by it; i.e., they also bind as (rational) normative constraints in the second sense. This is his argument with "the Foole". (b) Likewise, we find Hutcheson distinguishing two different things that might be meant by "obligation": (i) a motive of self-interest "sufficient to determine all those who duly consider it", and (ii) an explicitly moral obligation which depends on the approbation and condemnation of moral sense. Again, it is striking that he assumes the burden of arguing that these two will coincide. So a vicious person runs afoul both of his moral obligation and of the obligation of prudence, as we might call it. (c) Thus also, Hume. Hume simply follows Hutcheson in his distinction, and gives the terms "moral obligation" and "natural obligation" to the two ideas that Hutcheson had distinguished. And he argues that, at least with respect to justice, we have both a moral and natural obligation to uphold its dictates. V Each of these writers distinguishes the two features, and then tries to argue that, as things happen, they roughly coincide. But it is important to appreciate that, for all three, the coincidence of these features depends on circumstances that are, from the agent's point of view, given. They are part of the practical context as he finds it. So, for Hobbes, the coincidence depends on certain facts about human nature and interaction in competitive (Prisoner's Dilemma) situations. For Hutcheson, it depends on a rough coincidence between moral sense, benevolence, and self-love established by God. And for Hume, it depends on facts about human nature and coordinated agreement, similar to, although importantly different from those to which Hobbes alludes. There is a sense, then, in which the motivation that creates the coincidence between moral and "rational" obligation, as these thinkers are conceiving it, is heteronomous. It does not result from motives that are internal to the rational will, as such. Reason is, for these writers, simply a faculty for discovering the truth about the world by making inferences from experience. Hence what one will be moved by when one uses reason will depend on a given psychological makeup. Moreover, the coincidence arises without any essential role being played by the agent's guiding himself by a conception of justification. Self-love moves the agent in the direction of his own interest without any need for him to think that his interests provide him with a reason to act. That is epiphenomenal. VI With Butler and Rousseau, matters are very different. The coincidence of moral and "rational" obligation is assured, not by something external to autonomous will, but to the fact that the very standpoint from which the agent can make an assessment of what he is justified in doing is the same as that from which he renders moral judgment. (a) On the "transcendental" reading, anyway, Butler appears to hold that moral and rational agency both presuppose a standpoint from which the agent can reflect on his actual motives and endorse his motives as appropriate for (a person like) him to act on. This standpoint is the principle of reflection, or conscience: an informed, dispassionate, and disinterested point of view. (b) Likewise, Rousseau: autonomy is action on self-prescribed law from the standpoint of the general will. VII If we compare these approaches with those of Hobbes, Hutcheson, and Hume two things are striking. (i) The coincidence between moral obligation and "rational" obligation is not conditional on features external to rational judgment and will. The reason why I ought to follow my conscience, for Butler, is not that, as the world happens to be structured, I will have a better life if I do, although he clearly thinks that to be true. Rather, it is that nothing could be justified for me at all unless I had a conception of justification, and I can have this only by having a principle of reflection, so justification is therefore internal to what I judge from that standpoint. Similarly for Rousseau, but with appropriate changes for the general will. (ii) For Butler and Rousseau, the coincidence between moral and "rational" obligation is itself realized through the agent's own self-guidance by a conception of justification; that is what plays the critical role. VIII Still, there are features of both Butler's and Rousseau's account that may still feel heteronomous even so. This is perhaps most obvious with Butler, since whether an agent makes any particular judgment through his principle of reflection itself depends on his having a given psychological makeup. We won't make any judgments from this point of view unless we have some given responses from it, and Butler thinks this is simply created by God. With Rousseau things are more complicated. While he doesn't assume given conscientious judgments, and aims to construct these out of the idea of self-prescribed laws, these latter derive from a common interest that is simply given through membership in a particular community. IX Kant's account of moral obligations as categorical imperatives is thoroughly in the same tradition as that of Butler and Rousseau, but one way of viewing his thought is as attempting to overcome the heteronomous elements of both of theirs. For Kant aims to show that the moral life involves self-guidance by principles that one would prescribe to oneself (and others) from a standpoint available to one as a creature capable of a conception of justification, and, as such, capable of autonomy.

45. Immanuel Kant — Infoplease.com
More on Immanuel Kant from Infoplease Kant meaning and definitions Kant Definition and Pronunciation; Immanuel Kant - Biography of Immanuel Kant, German philosopher who
http://www.infoplease.com/ce6/people/A0827033.html

46. Catherine Chalier - What Ought I To Do? Morality In Kant And Levinas - Reviewed
Adrian Peperzak reviews this book by Catherine Chalier. From Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=1250

47. Immanuel Kant - Critique Of Practical Reason - Reviewed By Jeffrey Kinlaw , McMu
Jeffrey Kinlaw reviews this translation of the work by Immanuel Kant.
http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=1208

48. A. B. Dickerson - Kant On Representation And Objectivity - Reviewed By Robert Ho
Robert Howell reviews this book by A. B. Dickerson. From Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=4945

49. Philosophers : Immanuel Kant
Biography of the German thinker.
http://www.trincoll.edu/depts/phil/philo/phils/kant.html
Immanuel Kant
German Philosopher
See Also:

50. Kant, Immanuel — Ayn Rand Lexicon
The Ayn Rand Lexicon Metaphysics and Epistemology. The man who . . . closed the door of philosophy to reason, was Immanuel Kant. . . .
http://aynrandlexicon.com/lexicon/kant--immanuel.html
Kant, Immanuel
The Objectivist , Sept. 1971, 4.
Metaphysics and Epistemology
reason feeling , as a special sense of duty. collective objective to the collective not perceived by man. any consciousness, of consciousness as such. His argument, in essence, ran as follows: man is limited because he perceives them. For the New Intellectual identity as the disqualifying element of consciousness. process processed Atlas Shrugged processing by that organism, be it the need of air, of food or of knowledge. Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology not reason. No, Kant did not destroy reason; he merely did as thorough a job of undercutting as anyone could ever do.
Philosophy: Who Needs It
Leonard Peikoff, The Ominous Parallels Must men then resign themselves to a total skepticism? No, says Kant, there is one means of piercing the barrier between man and existence. Since reason, logic, and science are denied access to reality, the door is now open for men to approach reality by a different, nonrational method. The door is now open to faith . Taking their cue from their needs, men can properly

51. Immanuel Kant, 1724-1804
Biography of the thinker. From The History Guide.
http://www.historyguide.org/intellect/kant.html
Immanuel Kant, 1724-1804
The greatest member of the idealist school of German philosophy, Immanuel Kant was born at Knigsberg, where he spent his entire life, the son of a saddler, reputedly of Scottish origin. Raised in relative poverty and the puritanical strictness of Pietism, Kant studied at the university and after some years as a private tutor in 1755 obtained his doctorate and was appointed privatdozent . His lectures, unlike his written work, were often witty and humorous. The same year he published an essay in Newtonian cosmology in which he anticipated the nebular theory of Laplace and predicted the existence of the planet Uranus, before its actual discovery by Herschel in 1781. At first a rationalist, Kant became more skeptical of metaphysics in his "pre-critical" works as in Dreams of a Ghost-Seer (1766) against Swedenborg's mysticism. But Kant was dissatisfied with David Hume's reduction of knowledge of things and causation to mere habitual associations of sense-impressions. How for example was it possible for mathematics to apply to the objects of our sense-impressions? From 1775 he labored on an answer to Hume, which materialized in his Critique of Pure Reason (1781, 2nd ed., 1786), a philosophical classic, in which he shows that the immediate objects of perception are due not only to the evidence provided by our sensations but also to our own perceptual apparatus which orders our sense-impressions into intelligible unities. Whereas the former are rightly empirical and

52. Urban Dictionary: Kant, Immanuel
(b.1724d.1804) German professor of metaphysics at Konigsberg, who perhaps has been the most powerful influence on modern Western philosophical tho
http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=Kant, Immanuel

53. Kant, Immanuel (1724–1804) | Kant, Immanuel (1724–1804) Information | HighBe
Kant, Immanuel (1724–1804) Research Kant, Immanuel (1724–1804) articles at HighBeam.com. Find information, facts and related newspaper, magazine and journal articles
http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G2-3404900589.html

54. Religion Within The Limits Of Reason Alone
A slightly altered version of the Greene and Hudson translation, in sections.
http://www.hkbu.edu.hk/~ppp/rbbr/toc.html
Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone*
by Immanuel Kant
  • * English translation of Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft (preferred translation: "Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason"; click here to read an article defending this translation)
  • Full Text ASCII Archive
  • Created by Stephen Palmquist , with the help of several research assistants (thanks to a grant provided by Hong Kong Baptist University
  • First archived on 25 January 1996
The text presented here is based on the Greene and Hudson translation, with some minor corrections and, unfortunately, without the italics. The English edition page number is given in square brackets at the point where each printed page begins (except that words hyphenated across a page break appear on only one page). The text is presented here in five segments, with the footnotes appearing at the end of each segment. After each footnote number/symbol, the English page number on which it appears is given in square brackets.
  • The two Prefaces (pp.3-13): 1793 and 1794 editions
  • Book One (pp.15-49): "Concerning the Indwelling of the Evil Principle with the Good, or, On the Radical Evil in Human Nature"

55. Kant Immanuel | Facebook
Facebook is a social utility that connects people with friends and others who work, study and live around them. People use Facebook to keep up with friends, upload an unlimited
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56. Immanuel Kant, "Perpetual Peace"
Translation of this short 1795 essay by Kant.
http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/kant/kant1.htm
Immanuel Kant
Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch
PERPETUAL PEACE clausula salvatoria the author desires formally and emphatically to deprecate herewith any malevolent interpretation which might be placed on his words.
SECTION I
CONTAINING THE PRELIMINARY ARTICLES FOR PERPETUAL PEACE AMONG STATES 1. "No Treaty of Peace Shall Be Held Valid in Which There Is Tacitly Reserved Matter for a Future War" Otherwise a treaty would be only a truce, a suspension of hostilities but not peace, which means the end of all hostilitiesso much so that even to attach the word "perpetual" to it is a dubious pleonasm. The causes for making future wars (which are perhaps unknown to the contracting parties) are without exception annihilated by the treaty of peace, even if they should be dug out of dusty documents by acute sleuthing. When one or both parties to a treaty of peace, being too exhausted to continue warring with each other, make a tacit reservation ( reservatio mentalis) in regard to old claims to be elaborated only at some more favorable opportunity in the future, the treaty is made in bad faith, and we have an artifice worthy of the casuistry of a Jesuit. Considered by itself, it is beneath the dignity of a sovereign, just as the readiness to indulge in this kind of reasoning is unworthy of the dignity of his minister. But if, in consequence of enlightened concepts of statecraft, the glory of the state is placed in its continual aggrandizement by whatever means, my conclusion will appear merely academic and pedantic.

57. Kant, Immanuel From A Dictionary Of Philosophy, Third Edition | BookRags.com
Kant, Immanuel from A Dictionary of Philosophy, Third Edition. Kant, Immanuel summary with 1 pages of research material.
http://www.bookrags.com/tandf/kant-immanuel-3-tf/

58. Critique Of Pure Reason
Etext of the 1929 translation by Norman Kemp Smith.
http://www.hkbu.edu.hk/~ppp/cpr/toc.html
Critique of Pure Reason
The e-text version of this book is based on the 1929 Norman Kemp Smith translation, and appears in eight parts, as follows: This e-text version of this book was originally prepared by Stephen Palmquist and placed in the Oxford Text Archive in 1985.
A revised edition of Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason translated by Norman Kemp Smith and with a new preface by Howard Caygill has recently been published by Palgrave Macmillan. It is available in hardback, ISBN 1-4039-1194-0, priced 52.50/$79.95 and in paperback, ISBN 1-4039-1195-9, priced 18.99/$22.95 . To find out more about this title please click here Also recently re-issued by Palgrave Macmillan is A Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason by Norman Kemp Smith with a new Introduction by Sebastian Gardner. It is available in paperback, ISBN 1-4039-1504-0, priced 25.00/$39.95. To find out more about this title, please

59. Kant, Immanuel Summary | BookRags.com
Kant, Immanuel. Kant, Immanuel summary with 15 pages of encyclopedia entries, research information, and more.
http://www.bookrags.com/research/kant-immanuel-eorl-08/

60. Kant Metaphysic Morals
Sectionalized etext.
http://ethics.sandiego.edu/Books/Kant/MetaMorals/IE/Kant_MM_IE.htm
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